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*L.Q.R. 28 THOMPSON Land Ltd, a property developer from the State of Victoria, took out a loan
with the ANZ Banking Group secured by a floating charge over its assets. The bank subsequently
called in the loan, an event that triggered the automatic crystallisation of the charge, but allowed
Thompson to continue trading. Thompson then paid off four contractors using cash and securities that
were caught by the crystallised charge. What remained of the bank's security was insufficient to repay
the loan in full. Thompson's liquidator sought to recover the payments from the contractors on the
ground that they were unlawful preferences under the applicable equivalent *L.Q.R. 29 of Insolvency
Act 1986, s.239, a claim upheld by the High Court of Australia in G. & M. Aldridge Pty Ltd v Walsh
(2001) 203 C.L.R. 662.
It was common ground that the payments were made during the statutory twilight period and that
Thompson was insolvent at the time. The only issue was whether the payments gave the contractors
a “preference, priority or advantage over other creditors”. As the floating charge had already
crystallised, the assets used to make the payments belonged in equity to the bank. The contractors
argued that they had not made a priority gain at the expense of the other unsecured creditors
because the assets would not have been available to meet the claims of those creditors in any event.
We can demonstrate the plausibility of this contention by considering the case of a fixed charge. If a
company transfers assets the subject of a fixed charge to pay a debt owing to an unsecured creditor
(X) without the consent of the charge-holder (Y), the basic question to ask is whether X is better off as
a result, measuring any improvement in X's position by reference to a hypothetical liquidation arising
at the time of the transfer: see Calzaturificio Zenith Pty Ltd v N.S.W. Leather & Trading Co Pty Ltd
[1970] V.R. 605 at p.610; Re Ledingham-Smith [1993] B.C.L.C. 635 at pp.640-641. X acquires
nothing of any value from the company at the point of transfer because he receives Y's property. The
only circumstance in which X does receive value from the company at the point of transfer is where
Y's security, immediately before the transfer, was worth more than its claim against the company. X
then receives assets representing the company's equity of redemption which would have been
available to general creditors in an immediate liquidation. However, there was no such surplus in
Aldridge and it is beyond argument that the contractors were paid out of assets that would otherwise
have gone to the bank.
The problem that troubled the court was what happens if, after the transfer, the original owner either
does not, or can no longer, recover its property. The bank allowed the company to continue trading
after the charge had crystallised and so it was always possible that its property might find its way into
the hands of selected creditors, “with or without the bank's knowledge, in circumstances where the
bank either could do nothing, or might choose to do nothing, to undo that result” (p.673). The fact that
the bank's property would not have been available for distribution to unsecured creditors in
Thompson's liquidation was irrelevant; what mattered was that, in the absence of any action against
them by the bank, the contractors had enjoyed and retained the benefit of the payments whereas
other creditors had received nothing. In this respect, it is clear that the court regarded Aldridge as
being on all fours with its earlier decision in Richardson v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd
(1952) 85 C.L.R. 110, a case concerned with the crediting of a client's cheque to her insolvent
solicitor's overdrawn bank account. The court held that this payment was recoverable from the bank
as a preference even though it had received trust *L.Q.R. 30 property that would not have been
available to the solicitor's creditors had it remained in his hands. By receiving property that the client
had made no attempt to recover, the bank ended up in a better position than other unsecured
creditors: it got paid; they were left to prove in the solicitor's bankruptcy. Moreover, they were
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“exposed to the competition upon the assets of the proof of the defrauded owner” (p.137), a reference
to the bankrupt's exposure to a personal claim by his client for conversion of the cheque and/or
breach of trust.
The Aldridge/Richardson problem amounts to a three-cornered priority conflict between the
(allegedly) preferred creditor (X), the original owner (Y) and the debtor's unsecured creditors, with the
added twist that the court cannot make a binding determination of Y's rights because Y is not party to
the proceedings. By adopting a literal construction of the phrase “preference, priority and advantage
over other creditors”, the court has strongly reinforced the norm that unsecured creditors should be
treated equally to reach what may be perceived as a fair outcome in the proceedings before it. Even
so, the decision is anomalous. The object of preference law is to prevent the company's assets from
being distributed in violation of the established order of priority. Whilst X clearly gains in our scenario,
X's gain is not made at the expense of other unsecured creditors. Thus, it is not clear why those
creditors should be regarded as any more deserving than X from the perspective of insolvency law.
The point that other creditors were exposed to dilution of their claims by virtue of the bank's proof is
also not compelling. The increase in Y's claim resulting from the transaction is matched by a
corresponding decrease in X's claim. One claim is substituted for the other and the overall impact on
the distribution of the insolvent estate is surely neutral.
If we could say that the assets used to pay the contractors were somehow released from the bank's
charge on or before payment, we would then have a more satisfying justification for the outcome in
Aldridge. The contractors could be said to have acquired company (rather than bank) property which
should have been made available to unsecured creditors as a whole. The position would then be the
same as if the payments had been made before the floating charge crystallised. We can give the
theory legs by concentrating on the bank's conduct in the period between the date of crystallisation
and the making of the payments. There are three possibilities. First, the bank may have waived its
rights over the assets used to effect payment. Second, by allowing the company to continue trading
the bank may have caused its charge to decrystallise, thus restoring the company's power to dispose
of its assets in the ordinary course of business free of the security. Finally, and perhaps best of all, it
could be argued that the company had apparent authority to dispose of the charged assets until such
time as the contractors were put on notice of the fact that the charge had crystallised *L.Q.R. 31 (see
R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security, (2nd ed., 1988) at pp.70 and 90). These points
were not argued or discussed.
If we accept the Aldridge theory that insolvency law requires X to share its gain with the other
unsecured creditors, a party in X's position is potentially exposed to an action by the liquidator and a
claim by Y, with the possibility of having to pay twice. There was a strong presumption in Aldridge and
Richardson that Y had no surviving proprietary rights against X. However, as Y was not a party in
either case, Y's rights could not be determined. The court cannot simply infer that Y's rights are
exhausted unless the issues between X and Y are res judicata. This may explain why the court did
not consider the arguments advanced in the preceding paragraph of this note which serve to cut off
Y's proprietary rights at the time of the transaction. Even if we presume that there is no property or
traceable substitute left in X's hands which Y can claim, Y may have a personal action against X (a
distinct possibility in Richardson where the bank's receipt was wrongful because the branch manager
knew that the cheque was client money).
The decision in Aldridge rests on a strong version of the pari passu principle which will doubtless
appeal to those who argue that insolvency law has too much respect for the rights of secured
creditors. At present, there is no guarantee that an English court would arrive at the same outcome,
as an office-holder in this jurisdiction faces the additional hurdle of establishing that the company was
“influenced by a desire” to prefer: Insolvency Act 1986, s.239(5) and see Re M.C. Bacon Ltd [1990]
B.C.L.C. 324. Numerous commentators have made the case for the abolition of the section 239(5)
requirement and the remodelling of the cause of action along Australian lines. If the consensus
prevails, Aldridge may be a taste of things to come.
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